Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations by Powers, Simon T. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
6.
44
76
v2
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
22
 A
ug
 20
12
Punishment can promote defection in group-structured
populations
Simon T. Powersa,1,∗, Daniel J. Taylora, Joanna J. Brysona
aDepartment of Computer Science, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK
Abstract
Pro-social punishment, whereby cooperators punish defectors, is often suggested as a
mechanism that maintains cooperation in large human groups. Importantly, models
that support this idea have to date only allowed defectors to be the target of punish-
ment. However, recent empirical work has demonstrated the existence of anti-social
punishment in public goods games. That is, individuals that defect have been found
to also punish cooperators. Some recent theoretical studies have found that such anti-
social punishment can prevent the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation.
However, the evolution of anti-social punishment in group-structured populations has
not been formally addressed. Previous work has informally argued that group-structure
must favour pro-social punishment. Here we formally investigate how two demographic
factors, group size and dispersal frequency, affect selection pressures on pro- and anti-
social punishment. Contrary to the suggestions of previous work, we find that anti-
social punishment can prevent the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation
under a range of group structures. Given that anti-social punishment has now been
found in all studied extant human cultures, the claims of previous models showing the
co-evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation in group-structured populations
should be re-evaluated. [This is a post-print of an accepted manuscript published in
Journal of Theoretical Biology 311 (2012) 107–116. The publisher’s version is available
from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002251931200344X.]
Keywords: anti-social punishment, equilibrium selection, public goods, behavioural
economics, strong reciprocity
1. Introduction
Understanding the evolution of individually-costly cooperative behaviours is a ma-
jor focus of social evolution theory (Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975; Frank, 1998;
Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007; Archetti and Scheuring, 2012). It is now
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widely appreciated that cooperative behaviours can evolve if they provide either a direct
fitness benefit to the actor during its lifetime, or if they provide an indirect fitness benefit
by helping other cooperators (e.g. relatives, Hamilton, 1964; Lehmann and Keller, 2006;
West et al., 2007). A great deal of current research is aimed at understanding the bio-
logical mechanisms that provide direct or indirect fitness benefits in different scenarios
(Hammerstein, 2003; West et al., 2007). In particular, identifying the mechanisms that
provide direct or indirect fitness benefits to cooperators in large human groups, where ge-
netic relatedness is typically low, remains an open challenge. This question has received
much attention, due to the fact that humans appear to cooperate on a much larger scale
than other species, and thus large-scale cooperation seems to be one of the properties
that make human sociality unique.
Cooperation in humans is often framed in terms of the production and sharing of
various public goods. This may take the form of, for example, sharing food or information
with other group members, or contributing time, energy, and resources to a group project.
Throughout this paper, we focus on social dilemmas that take the form of linear public
goods games2. In linear public goods games (PGG) there is an apparent individual
advantage to defection, that is, to reaping the benefits of the public good without paying
the individual costs of contributing to it. We would expect such defectors to be fitter
than cooperators within the same group, and hence for natural selection to lead to the
breakdown of cooperation in a “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). However,
we see that cooperation is nevertheless maintained in large human groups despite the
apparent advantage of defection. Explaining this is problematic because many cases of
cooperation in humans occur in large groups of unrelated individuals.
Punishment behaviours have been widely suggested as a solution to this quandary. In
particular, cooperative individuals may have the option of punishing defectors. Typically,
punishment takes the form of an actor paying a cost by reducing its own fitness in order
to reduce the fitness of the punishment target, as in the following fitness functions:
wd = 1 +Bxp − Pxp (1)
wp = 1 +Bxp − C −Kxd, (2)
where wd is the fitness of defectors, and wp the fitness of pro-social punishers (individuals
who cooperate and then punish any group member that defected). In these functions B
is a constant representing the benefit that a single cooperator provides, C the cost of
cooperation, P a constant representing the cost of being punished, and K the cost of
punishing an individual. The constant 1 represents a baseline fitness in the absence of
social interactions.
The proportions of defectors and pro-social punishers within a group are denoted by xd
and xp, respectively. The relative cost of P and K is subject to some debate, however,
empirical evidence from PGG experiments show similar effects for a range of relative
values (Anderson and Putterman, 2006). In the present paper we assume that the cost
of being punished is partially distributed, and depends upon the proportion of punishers,
not the absolute number, in a group. This is a common assumption in models of the
evolution of punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; Lehmann et al.,
2See Archetti and Scheuring (2012) for a discussion of the differences between linear and non-linear
public goods games and how these affect the selective dynamics of cooperation.
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2007). We assume that an individual has a fixed amount of time and energy that can
be spent on acts of punishment, and also (as in prior work, Boyd and Richerson, 1992;
Boyd et al., 2003) that each punisher punishes every available target in its group, or at
least that their cost of punishment is proportional to their probability of encountering
punishment targets. The more individuals there are for an actor to punish, the less
effort the actor can exert on punishing any one individual, and hence the less absolute
damage is inflicted per punisher per target. Note that in most literature, punishment
targets are taken to be defectors, but in the case of anti-social punishment targets may
be cooperators.
In the above typical model, when pro-social punishers are sufficiently common within
a group, it is individually advantageous for potential defectors to switch behaviour to
cooperating. The condition for this is Pxp > Kxd + C, that is, when punishers are in
sufficient frequency that the cost of punishing and cooperating (i.e. being a pro-social
punisher) is less than the cost of being punished (Lehmann et al., 2007). Thus, in this
simple model the evolutionarily stable states are either pro-social punishment at fixation,
or defection at fixation. Note that this result holds even in a well-mixed population, and
so would be applicable to large groups of unrelated individuals (Boyd and Richerson,
1992).
There are, however, at least three problems with this as a mechanism for the mainte-
nance of cooperation in human groups. The first is that because both pro-social punish-
ment and defection are equilibria, why would we expect natural selection to lead to one
rather than the other (Boyd et al., 2003)? It has been argued that group selection (in
the broad sense, Okasha, 2006) should promote the pro-social punishment equilibrium
(Boyd et al., 2003; Bowles and Gintis, 2004), because this increases the mean fitness of
group members. The second problem is that pro-social punishment may not actually
be stable under mutation if cooperation and punishment are not perfectly linked traits
(Lehmann et al., 2007). This is because pro-social punishers may be slowly replaced
by non-punishing cooperators that do not pay the cost of punishing, and who are not
themselves punished (the second-order free-riding problem, Colman, 2006). As pro-social
punishers decline in frequency due to the accumulation of non-punish mutations, defec-
tion may again become advantageous. The third problem is that there is no reason to
suppose that only defectors can be targets of punishment: defectors may have the option
of punishing cooperators, as evidenced by recent empirical work (Herrmann et al., 2008).
Exploring the consequences of this third problem, termed anti-social punishment (ASP)
motivates the present investigation.
Recent theoretical work (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011) has suggested
that anti-social punishment can thwart the evolution of pro-social punishment and coop-
eration. However, no study has formally addressed anti-social punishment in group-
structured populations, even though such population structures are frequently mod-
elled when considering the evolution of pro-social punishment (Boyd et al., 2003, 2010;
Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Lehmann et al., 2007). Group-structured populations are an es-
sential component of cultural group selection, and of recent arguments about punishment
promoting group-beneficial cultural norms in humans (Boyd et al., 2003; Gintis et al.,
2003; Mathew and Boyd, 2011; Sober and Wilson, 1998). Thus such populations warrant
an explicit model in order to determine whether the inclusion of anti-social punishment
affects the claims of these works. For example, some previous work has verbally argued
that the presence of group-structure should be expected to favour pro-social punishment
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even when anti-social punishment is present (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011).
According to this view, we might not expect anti-social punishment to have any effect
in group-structured populations. Clearly, the implications for the understanding of the
proximate mechanisms promoting cooperation in humans motivate a formal examination
of this case.
In this paper, we formally address the evolution of anti-social punishment in group-
structured populations, focusing on the conditions under which it prevents the evolution
of pro-social punishment. We also consider the effects of non-punishing cooperator and
defector mutations.
2. A model of the evolution of pro- and anti-social punishment in group-
structured populations
We consider here a population of individuals that live and reproduce in social groups
for a number of generations. In each generation, the following two-phase social inter-
action occurs and determines fitness within the group. Firstly, each individual either
cooperates by paying an individual cost to contribute to a public good, or defects by
not contributing. All group members then receive an equal share of the benefit of this
good, regardless of whether they cooperated in its production or not. Then, in the sec-
ond stage individuals have the option of punishing other group members, based on how
they behaved in the first stage. We model here the evolution of four behavioural strate-
gies: cooperate but do not punish (non-punishing cooperate); defect but do not punish
(non-punishing defect); cooperate and punish all individuals that defected (pro-social
punisher); defect and punish all individuals that cooperated (anti-social punisher). The
fitness of these four types within a single group is given, respectively, by the following
fitness functions:
wc = 1 +B(xc + xp)− C − Pxa (3)
wd = 1 +B(xc + xp)− Pxp (4)
wp = 1 +B(xc + xp)− C −K(xd + xa)− Pxa (5)
wa = 1 +B(xc + xp)−K(xc + xp)− Pxp. (6)
Here, xc, xd, xp and xa are the proportions of non-punishing cooperators, non-
punishing defectors, pro-social punishers and anti-social punishers, respectively. As in
the previous section, B is a constant representing the benefit that a single cooperator
provides, and C is a constant representing the cost of cooperation. K and P are con-
stants representing the cost of punishing and being punished, respectively. The constant
1 represents a baseline fitness in the absence of social interactions. These fitness functions
are based on those commonly used to model the evolution of pro-social punishment (e.g.
Boyd et al., 2003; Lehmann et al., 2007), with the addition here of anti-social punish-
ment. Note that in this model, pro-social punishers punish both types of defectors, i.e.
non-punishing defectors and anti-social punishers. Likewise, anti-social punishers punish
both types of cooperators, i.e. non-punishing cooperators and pro-social punishers.
The number of individuals of type i, ni, within a group changes deterministically each
generation according to the following difference equation:
ni(t+ 1) = ni(t) + ni(t)wi, (7)
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where t refers to the current generation, and wi is the fitness of type i within the group
at the current generation, as given by Equations 3–6. Fractional parts are maintained
throughout. We assume that reproduction is asexual, and that genotypes are haploid
with a single locus determining behaviour. Note that in Equation 7 all individuals of the
same type (strategy) within any one group have the same fitness, and reproduce by the
same amount. Thus, within groups we do not need to explicitly track each individual,
but can simply track type densities.
The above fitness functions describe social interactions within single groups. At the
metapopulation level, we model groups formed by random sampling of n individuals from
a global migrant pool of size N . This sampling is done without replacement, according
to a multivariate hypergeometric distribution. Reproduction and selection then occurs
deterministically within these groups for T generations, according to Equation 7. Note
that there is no local density regulation in Equation 7, thus, different groups may grow
to different sizes over the course of the T generations. After T generations dispersal
occurs (ecologically, dispersal could be triggered by depletion of a resource patch, for
example). During the dispersal stage, a new migrant pool is formed by summing the
absolute type densities across all groups. Groups that have grown to a larger size will
make up a larger fraction of the new pool, representing a form of global competition
between groups. Global population regulation then occurs by proportionality rescaling
the migrant pool back to size N . The number of individuals of a type after population
regulation is computed by calculating the proportion of that type in the migrant pool
and multiplying by N , rounding the result to remove fractional parts and produce an
integer number of individuals.
Each individual in the migrant pool undergoes mutation with probability µ. If chosen
for mutation, an individual’s genotype is changed randomly to one of the other three
types with equal probability. The individuals in the migrant pool then form the next
generation of groups (i.e. colonise a new set of resource patches), as previously described.
This process of group formation and dispersal then continues for a number of cycles, G.
We simulate the model by the following procedure:
1. Initialisation: form a migrant pool of N individuals with Nc non-punishing co-
operators, Nd non-punishing defectors, Np pro-social punishers and Na anti-social
punishers.
2. Group formation: form ⌊N/n⌋ groups of size n by random sampling from the mi-
grant pool without replacement (where ⌊⌋ denotes the mathematical floor function).
3. Reproduction and selection within groups: iterate equation 7 T times for each
group (see text).
4. Dispersal: all individuals leave their groups to form a new migrant pool. The
migrant pool is then rescaled back to size N , keeping the proportion of types the
same. Fractional parts are rounded.
5. Mutation: each individual in the migrant pool undergoes mutation with probability
µ (see text).
6. Iteration: repeat from step 2 for G cycles.
The population structure described above is based on the Haystack model
(Maynard Smith, 1964; Cohen et al., 1976; Wilson, 1987; Sober and Wilson, 1998;
Bergstrom, 2002; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004, 2007; Powers et al., 2011), where we allow
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both the size of social groups when they are founded, and the frequency of dispersal, to
be parameterised. When T = 1 and dispersal occurs every generation, this corresponds
to the well-studied trait-group model of Wilson, (1975; c.f. Hamilton 1975; Michod
1983; Nunney 1985; Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995; Pepper 2000; Okasha 2006;
Santos and Szathma´ry 2008). This provides us with a simple model that allows the eco-
logical and demographic factors affecting between-group variance, and hence the strength
of group selection, to be varied (Sober and Wilson, 1998).
3. Results
In this section we show how two demographic factors, group size and dispersal fre-
quency, affect whether selection will favour pro- or anti-social punishment, or no pun-
ishment at all. We first present analytical results from a simpler version of the model in
which pairs of strategies compete, and dispersal frequency is fixed with groups dispersing
after every generation. This population structure corresponds to Wilson’s (1975) trait-
group model. It also parallels the anonymous single-shot public goods games used in
behavioural economics experiments, particularly those used to study strong reciprocity
(Fehr et al., 2002). We then go on to present results from the full simulation model
in which all four strategies are present simultaneously, and both dispersal frequency as
well as group size is varied. Less frequent dispersal (T > 1) corresponds to a Haystack
population structure, and is an evolutionary analogue of repeated economic public goods
games.
3.1. Analytical results
We explore first the evolutionary dynamics where only two strategies are present in the
population at any one time, and where dispersal occurs every generation (T = 1). We first
note that the fitness of each type is frequency-dependent (Equations 3–6). In particular,
the fitness of both pro- and anti-social punishers is positive frequency-dependent. This is
because the total cost of punishing decreases as punishers become more common (since
less acts of punishment are required), while the total cost of being punished increases
(due to more individuals performing punishing acts). Thus, although neither type of
punishment may easily be able to invade from rarity (though see Discussion, Section 4),
they can be selected for from higher initial frequencies (Lehmann et al., 2007). We
therefore focus on how the initial proportion of a strategy required for it to be selectively
favoured changes with respect to group size. In addition to the analytical results, we
verified each threshold frequency derived below numerically in the simulation model.
3.1.1. Non-punishing cooperators vs. non-punishing defectors
We first consider pairwise competition between non-punishing cooperators and non-
punishing defectors. The fitness of each type, given a group containing j cooperating
co-players, is:
wc(j) = B
j + 1
n
− C + 1
= B
j
n
+
B
n
− C + 1
wd(j) = B
j
n
+ 1 (8)
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To calculate whether cooperation increases or decreases in proportion, we need to know
the probability distribution Pn(j) for an individual to be placed in a group with j cooper-
ators, given that xc is the global frequency of cooperators. In our model, we assume that
groups are formed by a random sampling process. In the full model, this sampling occurs
without replacement from a finite population according to a hypergeometric distribution.
However, for ease of analysis we derive the analytical results in this section by sampling
groups from an infinite population with replacement; this does not significantly alter the
qualitative behaviour of the results. We thus model group formation in this section by
sampling from a binomial distribution.
Let gc and gd be the fitness of the cooperators and defectors after the groups have
been formed. We can calculate them by
gc =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wc(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjc(1− xc)
n−1−jwc(j)
= xcB
n− 1
n
+
B
n
− C + 1
gd =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wd(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjc(1− xc)
n−1−jwd(j)
= xcB
n− 1
n
+ 1, (9)
where xc is the global proportion of cooperators. We see that cooperation increases in
frequency in the population when gc > gd,which occurs when
B
n
> C. (10)
This is a standard result for the evolution of weak altruism in linear public goods games,
i.e. social traits that increase the absolute fitness of the actor but increase the absolute
fitness of other group members by even more (Wilson, 1975, 1979, 1990; Nunney, 1985;
Szathma´ry, 2011). Because all group members receive the benefit of cooperation, includ-
ing the actor, then cooperation is selected for whenever the actor’s share of the benefit
exceeds the cost to itself. This depends on group size and is given by B/n > C (Fig-
ure 1a). This type of cooperation corresponds to what Pepper (2000) terms a whole-group
trait. Biological examples of such whole-group traits include siderophore production in
bacteria (Griffin et al., 2004), and the efficient use of shared resources through lower
consumption rates (Pfeiffer et al., 2001; Kreft, 2004; Killingback et al., 2006). Whole-
group traits also parallel the setup of economic public goods games (Fehr et al., 2002;
Herrmann et al., 2008). For such traits a smaller group size favours cooperation because
a cooperator receives a larger share of the benefits of its actions. In this model whenever
B/n > C, cooperation fixes in the global population irrespective of starting frequency,
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assuming deterministic evolution. For B/n < C defection fixes. An equivalent way of
thinking about this is that for whole-group traits (such as public goods), the relatedness
of actor to recipients in this population structure is 1/n, assuming an infinite global
population size (Pepper, 2000). Relatedness here is taken to mean a genetic correlation
between actor and recipients at the locus for cooperation (Foster et al., 2006; West et al.,
2007). The condition B/n > C is then an instance of Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964).
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Figure 1: Analytical results of pairwise competition between strategies. Groups are
formed by binomial sampling from the global population and disperse every generation
(trait-group model). For this plot, parameters other than group size are fixed to the
values used later in the simulations (B=0.9, C=0.1, K=0.1, P=0.5), c.f. main text.
a) Non-punishing cooperators vs. non-punishing defectors. b) Pro-social punishers vs.
non-punishing defectors. c) Anti-social punishers vs. non-punishing cooperators. d)
Anti-social vs. pro-social punishers.
3.1.2. Pro-social punishers vs. non-punishing defectors
We next investigate the evolutionary dynamics of pro-social punishers compared to
defectors. Recall that pro-social punishers are cooperators that identify individuals that
defected, and then pay a fitness cost K to reduce the fitness of defectors in their group
by P . From this we can derive the fitness of both strategies, given that they are placed
in a group containing j pro-social punishers
wp(j) = B
j + 1
n
− C −K
n− (j + 1)
n
+ 1
wd(j) = (B − P )
j
n
+ 1 (11)
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As before, we assume that the distribution of strategies to groups is binomial; Pn(j) is
then the probability of being placed in a group with j pro-social punishers, given that
groups are of size n. From this, we calculate the fitnesses of each individual:
gp =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wp(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjp(1− xp)
n−1−jwp(j)
= xp(B +K)
n− 1
n
+
B
n
− C −K
n− 1
n
+ 1
gd =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wd(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjp(1− xp)
n−1−jwd(j)
= xp(B − P )
n− 1
n
+ 1, (12)
where xp is the global frequency of pro-social punishers. Pro-social punishment increases
in proportion when gp > gd, or when
xp > x
∗
p =
Cn−B
(n− 1)(P +K)
+
K
P +K
, (13)
where x∗p is the proportion of punishers needed in the population for punishment to be
selectively favoured. x∗p is horizontally asymptotic, with respect to group size n, with
the asymptote at x∗p =
C+K
P+K . Figure 1b plots this critical value as function of n, the
group size, using the parameters (B = 0.9, C = 0.1, K = 0.1, P = 0.5) that we later
use in the simulations; we discuss robustness of the numerical results with respect to
these parameters in Section 3.3. This result agrees with Equation 11 of Lehmann et al.
(2007) (noting that we include the effect of a punisher on itself) for the case of randomly
formed groups that disperse every generation, and applies where pro-social punishment
and cooperation are perfectly linked traits. We relax these assumptions in the simulation
model (Section 3.2).
3.1.3. Non-punishing cooperators vs. anti-social punishers
We now turn to investigate the dynamics of anti-social punishers in competition with
non-punishing cooperators. In particular, we focus on whether anti-social punishment
can prevent the invasion of cooperation even when B/n > C, i.e. even when the actor
gains in absolute fitness terms from cooperating. The fitnesses in a group containing j
cooperators are:
wc(j) = B
j + 1
n
− C − P
n− (j + 1)
n
+ 1
wa(j) = (B −K)
j
n
+ 1 (14)
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Let gc and ga be the fitness of non-punishing cooperators and anti-social punishers re-
spectively. Again let Pn(j), the probability of an individual being placed in a group
with j cooperators, have a probability mass function of a binomially distributed random
variable. Then
gc =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wc(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjc(1− xc)
n−1−jwc(j)
= xc(B + P )
n− 1
n
+
B
n
− C − P
n− 1
n
+ 1
ga =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wa(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjc(1− xc)
n−1−jwa(j)
= xc(B −K)
n− 1
n
+ 1, (15)
where xc is the global proportion of cooperators. Cooperation thus increases in propor-
tion when:
xc > x
∗
c =
Cn−B
(n− 1)(P +K)
+
P
P +K
. (16)
Critically, we see that cooperation can also decrease in proportion, even when B/n−C >
0. Figure 1c plots the critical value x∗c against group size n. This has a horizontal
asymptote at x∗c =
C+P
P+K .
3.1.4. Anti-social vs. pro-social punishers
Finally, we consider the dynamics of a population containing both pro- and anti-social
punishers. As before, we let wp(j), and wa(j) be the fitness of a pro-social punisher and
an anti-social punisher in a group of size n, containing j pro-social punishers (excluding
self). Then
wp(j) = B
j + 1
n
− C − (P +K)
n− (j + 1)
n
+ 1
wa(j) = (B −K − P )
j
n
+ 1 (17)
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Let gp and ga be the fitness of each type after they have been placed into groups. The
groups are again formed binomially. Then,
gp =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wp(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjp(1− xp)
n−1−jwp(j)
= xp(B + P +K)
n− 1
n
+
B
n
− C − (P +K)
n− 1
n
+ 1
ga =
n−1∑
j=0
Pn(j)wa(j)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xjp(1− xp)
n−1−jwa(j)
= xp(B −K − P )
n− 1
n
+, (18)
where xp is the global proportion of pro-social punishers. Thus, punishment increases in
proportion in the global population when
xp > x
∗
p =
Cn−B
2(n− 1)(P +K)
+
1
2
. (19)
This has a horizontal asymptote at x∗p =
C+K+P
2(P+K) . The critical initial frequency for
pro-social punishment to be selected is plotted with respect to group size in Figure 1d.
3.1.5. Pro-social punishment vs. cooperation, anti-social punishment vs. defection, and
the second-order free-riding problem
In the absence of other strategies, pro-social punishment is neutral with non-punishing
cooperate. This is because in such a case there are no individuals to be punished, and
hence the total cost of punishing is zero. Likewise, anti-social punishment is neutral with
non-punishing defection in the absence of other strategies. However, all four strategies
may always be present in above-zero frequency in a population due to mutation. In
such cases the effects of pro-social punishment, in terms of reducing the proportion of
defectors and anti-social punishers in the group, are shared equally by both pro-social
punishers and non-punishing cooperators. Non-punishing cooperators, however, would
not pay the cost of punishing and so would be expected to be fitter (the second-order
public goods problem, Colman, 2006; Eldakar and Wilson, 2008). Similarly the effects of
anti-social punishment, in terms of reducing the frequency of competing individuals with
the cooperative trait, are felt equally by both anti-social punishers and non-punishing
defectors in the same group. Non-punishing defectors, however, do not pay the cost of
punishment. Thus, since in this model neither type of punishment differentially benefits
punishers within a group, we might expect both types of punisher to be replaced by their
non-punishing counterparts. Hence, we would not expect either type of punishment to
be evolutionarily stable when non-punishing mutants are introduced. We investigate this
through simulation in the next section.
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3.2. Simulation results
For the primary simulation results below, we fix the migrant pool size at N = 500, the
benefit of cooperation at B = 0.9, the cost of cooperation at C = 0.1, the cost of being
punished at P = 0.5, the cost to the punisher at K = 0.1, and the mutation rate at
µ = 0.01. We vary the group size, n, and the number of generations before dispersal, T .
We thus focus on the demographic factors that affect selection on punishment. We return
to examining parameter sensitivity after presenting the primary results (Section 3.3).
As the analytic results above show, outcomes are sensitive to initial conditions, since
selection pressures depend upon the frequencies of all four strategies (Equations 3–6).
As a consequence, although a type may not be likely to invade when rare, it may be
maintained or increase in frequency by selection when established at sufficient frequency.
In this study, we focus on the initial condition where all four strategies are present in
equal frequency. We address the validity of this assumption in the Discussion (Section 4).
As we show below, from this state pro-social punishment and cooperation will be selected
against in a well-mixed population. We therefore investigate how the presence of various
types of group structure changes selection pressures on the maintenance of both types of
punishment.
3.2.1. Well-mixed population
We first investigate the effects of mutation in a well-mixed population. In the present
model, we do this by setting n = N = 500 and T = 1. With all four strategies started in
equal frequency, both cooperate and pro-social punishment are driven extinct, apart from
reintroduction by recurring mutation (fig. 2a). If anti-social punishment was neutral with
non-punishing defect, we would expect both types to reach a proportion of approximately
50% under mutation. However, we see that anti-social punishment is in fact weakly
selected against, being held at a frequency of around 40%. This is because anti-social
punishers are paying the cost of punishing the few cooperators and pro-social punishers
that are being reintroduced by mutation. The total cost of these acts of punishment
is not large, however, because there are few individuals to punish and cooperators are
selected against in a well-mixed population even without anti-social punishment (see
analytical results, Section 3.1.1).
We next consider the case where pro-social punishment is initially fixed in the popu-
lation. If only defectors (and anti-social punishers) arose by mutation, then pro-social
punishment would be stable. However, we also allow for the possibility of non-punishing
cooperators. In this situation, non-punishing cooperator mutants increase in frequency
towards 50% (fig. 2b), as would be expected if pro-social punishment was neutral with
non-punishing cooperation. However, the resulting decline in the frequency of pro-social
punishment under mutation creates a second-order Tragedy of the Commons. That is,
as pro-social punishment drops in frequency acts of punishment become too rare to pre-
vent defection from being favoured; the condition for punishment to prevent defection
in a well-mixed population (Pxp > Kxd + C) is then no longer met. The increase in
non-punishing cooperators thus creates a selective environment that favours defection.
This illustrates that pro-social punishment need not be stable in a well-mixed population
when non-punishing mutants are introduced. We also note that this result holds even
in the absence of anti-social punishment. Anti-social punishment thus plays no selective
role in a well-mixed population, and is maintained at a frequency below that expected
under neutrality with non-punishing defect.
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Figure 2: Simulation results of competition between pro-social punishers, anti-social pun-
ishers, non-punishing cooperators, and non-punishing defectors in a well-mixed population
with mutation. a) All types initially present in equal frequency, showing the selective
advantage of defection from this initial frequency. b) Pro-social punishment initially at
fixation. Although stable as a strategy against invasion by defectors only (not shown),
the increase in non-punishing cooperator mutants creates a second-order Tragedy of the
Commons in which first pro-social punishment, and subsequently cooperation, collapses.
3.2.2. Effect of group size
We now consider the effects of group structure on the selective dynamics. We first
vary group size, holding T = 1. With all four strategies started in equal frequency, we
find that cooperation and pro-social punishment fix in the population for group sizes
n < B/C. With B = 0.1 and C = 0.9, in our model this is a group size less than
9. This is the classic result for randomly formed, single generational groups, without
punishment (see analytical results). Thus, in this case allowing both cooperators and
defectors to punish gives the same outcome as if neither type could punish. However,
if the option of pro-social punishment is removed (by replacing all pro-social punishers
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with non-punishing cooperators in the initial condition), but anti-social punishment is
maintained, we find that the condition for cooperation to evolve is more stringent than
n < B/C. Specifically, we found that cooperation only evolved for a group size less than
7. On the other hand, if anti-social punishment is removed from the initial condition (by
replacing all anti-social punishers with non-punishing defectors), then cooperation and
pro-social punishment can evolve even for group sizes where n > B/C. In terms of the
parameters used in this study, pro-social punishment and cooperation reliably evolved in
group sizes below 14, i.e. above the threshold of B/C = n = 9.
Importantly, when n > B/C then a whole-group trait that provides a fixed amount of
benefit switches from being weakly to strongly altruistic (Pepper, 2000), or becomes
“altruistic” in the sense used by Hamilton (1964) and more recently advocated by
Lehmann and Keller (2006) and West et al. (2007). Such cooperation, when considered
outside the context of punishment, causes an absolute reduction in the lifetime fitness of
the actor. This illustrates that pro-social punishment can allow a cooperative trait that
would otherwise be strongly altruistic to evolve in randomly formed groups. This oc-
curs because pro-social punishment modifies the direct costs and benefits of cooperation,
so that it is effectively no longer altruistic (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Lehmann et al.,
2007).
We also find that pro-social punishment and non-punishing cooperation form a stable
polymorphic equilibrium in such cases, even in the presence of recurrent mutations. That
is, the second-order Tragedy of the Commons does not occur in such group-structured
populations. The reason for this, and the maintenance of pro-social punishment and
cooperation even when n > B/C, is due to the fact that the population structure provides
localised interactions. Specifically, mean fitness is lower in groups containing a greater
proportion of defectors (Equations 3–6). Thus after dispersal such groups will make up
a smaller fraction of the migrant pool, since the groups will contain fewer individuals
relative to other groups after one iteration of Equation 7. For this to occur, different
groups must contain different proportions of defectors when they are formed. That is,
there must be variance in the composition of groups (Wilson, 1975). Since the groups are
formed by random sampling, a smaller group size provides greater variance. Thus, smaller
group sizes provide stronger selection against defection and anti-social punishment.
The results of this section illustrate that either type of punishment can prevent the evo-
lution of a behaviour which would otherwise be selected given the population structure.
They also illustrate that when both types of punishment are started in equal frequency
their effects can be canceled out, with the population structure again becoming the de-
terminant of selection on cooperation.
3.2.3. Effect of dispersal frequency
We next investigate varying the number of generations between dispersal episodes,
T . We first consider the case in which anti-social punishment is removed, giving initial
starting frequencies of 25% pro-social punishers, 25% non-punishing cooperators, and
50% non-punishing defectors. Figure 3a shows the effect of T on the largest group size
for which the equilibrium is polymorphic for pro-social punishment and non-punishing
cooperation, i.e. where defection is removed by selection. We took a simulation run to
reach this equilibrium when the global proportion of pro-social punishers and cooperators
exceeded 75% after 1000 cycles. The shading in the figure indicates the number of
simulation runs, out of 100, which reached this equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Effect of varying both group size and dispersal frequency. The shading indi-
cates the number of simulation runs, out of 100, in which selection favoured pro-social
punishment and cooperation after 1000 cycles. a) Without anti-social punishment; b)
with anti-social punishment. Smaller group size increases variation in group composition,
thus providing stronger selection against defection. Less frequent dispersal favours pro-
social punishment by creating an equilibrium selection process. However, the addition of
anti-social punishment reduces the largest group size under which pro-social punishment
and cooperation are selected. Initial conditions for this simulation are given in the text.
The results show that the largest group size for which pro-social punishment and
cooperation are selected increases with T . At first sight this result is surprising, since in
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classic Haystack models without punishment a large T eliminates cooperation (Wilson,
1987; Sober and Wilson, 1998). This is because in such models there is only a single
equilibrium within-groups: all defect. Thus, in the limit of T approaching infinity any
group founded by at least one defector will be converted to all defect. Frequent dispersal
can, though, keep the population out of this equilibrium and allow cooperation to be
stable globally (Sober and Wilson, 1998). However, the addition of pro-social punishment
to such models means that groups founded by one or more defectors need not, for high
T , be converted to all defect.
For illustration, consider groups consisting of pro-social punishers and non-punishing
defectors. Pro-social punishment is then a stable equilibrium within the group whenever
the proportion of punishers causes the condition Pxp > Kxd+C to be satisfied. Since a
single group constitutes a well-mixed population, i.e. each group member interacts with
all other group members with respect to public goods, this occurs above the limit of C+K
P+K
(see analytical results). Under the parameters used in the simulations, this is when the
fraction of pro-social punishers when the group is founded is greater than 1/3. Groups
founded by more than this proportion of pro-social punishers will thus be stable against
defection. Thus, a high T need not cause an increase in defection within each group.
Moreover, individuals in groups at the pro-social punishment equilibrium have a higher
mean fitness, due to the benefits of cooperation (Equations 4–5). The more generations
the group stays together for, the greater the cumulative total of this benefit compared
to non-cooperation groups, since groups grow at an exponential rate (with no negative
density-dependent effects) in accordance with Equation 7. Consequently, when dispersal
eventually occurs groups at the pro-social punishment equilibrium will have grown to a
larger size, and will hence make up a larger fraction of the migrant pool.
A larger T can thus favour pro-social punishment, due to the reproductive advantage
that individuals in groups at the pro-social punishment equilibrium enjoy with each gen-
eration that the group stays together. This mechanism depends upon some groups being
founded with type frequencies that fall within the basin of attraction for the pro-social
punishment equilibrium, i.e. with xp > 1/3. This can occur in a group-structured popu-
lation even when the global value of xp is below this (i.e. 0.25 as used in the simulations),
provided there is variance in the composition of groups when they are founded. In our
model, this variance is provided through the formation of groups by hypergeometric (ran-
dom) sampling of individuals from the migrant pool. This variance decreases, however,
as the founding size of the groups becomes larger. Thus for larger group sizes, fewer
groups lie in the basin of attraction for the pro-social punishment equilibrium. This
explains why for large group sizes, a large T may not be sufficient to select for pro-social
punishment, because too few (or no) groups may fall in its basin of attraction.
Finally, we consider the effects of varying T as well as group size when anti-social
punishment is added to the model. In Figure 3b we use the same parameters as in Fig-
ure 3a, but here we reintroduce anti-social punishment, returning to the initial condition
in which all four strategies are at 25%. In this case we see that pro-social punishment and
cooperation are selected over a much smaller range of group sizes for a given dispersal
frequency. As T is increased, the increase in the largest group size under which pro-social
punishment and cooperation are selected is also less pronounced.
The reason for this result is that the basin boundary for the pro-social punishment
equilibrium changes within a group. In particular, from the analytical results we know
that in a single group founded by pro-social punishers and anti-social punishers only, the
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basin boundary lies at xp = 1 −
C+K+P
2(P+K) , which is a more stringent condition than the
population without anti-social punishment (C+K
P+K ). Under the parameters used in the
simulation, this corresponds to xp > 1/3 without anti-social punishment, and xp > 5/12
in the presence of anti-social punishment. We verified numerically that this result holds
in the four-type system when the three other types are all started in equal proportion.
Thus for a given frequency of pro-social punishment in the migrant pool, fewer groups
are expected to fall in the basin of attraction for the pro-social punishment equilibrium
when some of the non-punishing defectors are replaced with anti-social punishers. The
presence of anti-social punishment therefore means that a larger between-group variance
(relative to the migrant pool value of xp) is required to select for pro-social punishment.
3.3. Sensitivity to the effect-to-cost ratio of cooperation and punishment
The benefit-to-cost ratio of the cooperative act affects the largest group size in which
cooperation can evolve. Without either type of punishment, when T = 1 then coop-
eration is selectively advantageous when B/n > C; this is the well-known result from
Wilson’s (1975) trait-group model when groups are formed randomly. When both pro-
and anti-social punishment are available, and all four strategies are initially present in
the population at equal frequency, then our simulations shows that the effects of both
type of punishment on the level of cooperation cancel out. In other words, the condition
for cooperation to be favoured is still B/n > C when both types of punishment are added
and T = 1. We find this result to be insensitive to the effect-to-cost ratio of punishment;
it holds in the simulations even for P = K = 0.1, as well as for P > K.
For T > 1, we find that the addition of anti-social punishment reduces the largest
group size over which cooperation evolves, compared to the case where only pro-social
punishment was available. This result is also qualitatively insensitive to the benefit-to-
cost ratio of cooperation. That is, decreasing the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation
decreases the largest group size in which cooperation evolves in the case where both
anti- and pro-social punishment are present, and similarly in the case where only pro-
social punishment is available. The result that anti-social punishment further reduces
this over the pro-social punishment only case, however, still holds regardless of the B/C
ratio when K = 0.1 and P = 0.5. Further, we found that increasing P (while holding K
constant) increases the magnitude of this effect. That is, the addition of anti-social pun-
ishment makes a greater difference as P increases. As P decreases, however, both types
of punishment have less effect and the difference between the two cases becomes smaller.
When K = 0.1 and P < 0.4, we found that the addition of anti-social punishment made
no difference to the range of group sizes over which cooperation evolves, compared to the
case where only pro-social punishment is available.
It should be noted that P > K is a common assumption in both models of the evolu-
tion of punishment (e.g. Boyd et al. 2003, 2010; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Lehmann et al.
2007; dos Santos et al. 2011), and in experimental public goods games (Fehr et al., 2002;
Herrmann et al., 2008). Nevertheless, measuring the actual cost-to-effect ratio of pun-
ishment in situ in real populations is very difficult. Indeed, some authors have explicitly
considered the case where P = K (Rand et al., 2010). However, at least in the case of
humans it is commonly held that the advent of tools from gossip to weaponry makes pun-
ishment very effective at little cost to the punisher (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Bingham,
1999; Boehm, 1999; Binmore, 2005). We have thus focused our study on cases where
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punishment is reasonably efficient in terms of effect-to-cost ratio, whilst still being less
efficient than the benefit-to-cost ratio of the cooperative act.
4. Discussion and conclusion
We have presented here, to our knowledge, the first model of the evolution of anti-social
punishment in group-structured populations. Previous work on anti-social punishment
has nevertheless suggested that group structure would favour pro-social punishment and
prevent anti-social punishment from being effective (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak,
2011). Further, much previous work on the evolution of pro-social punishment in group-
structured populations has not even considered the possibility of anti-social punishment
(e.g. Boyd et al. 2003, 2010; Gardner and West 2004; Lehmann et al. 2007), presumably
for the same reason. After all, group or kin selection should be expected to promote
behaviours that support cooperation rather than defection, assuming a population struc-
ture that provides positive relatedness at the locus for cooperation (Hamilton, 1964;
Wilson, 1975).
In fact, we have shown here that anti-social punishment can be effective in the pre-
venting the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation in group-structured pop-
ulations. Models for the evolution of pro-social punishment typically rely both on pro-
social punishment being a stable equilibrium within a group, and on some groups be-
ing founded with initial strategy frequencies that fall within the basin of attraction for
this equilibrium. When these two conditions are met, equilibrium selection between
groups can occur (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988; Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Binmore, 1998;
Canals and Vega-Redondo, 1998), such that groups at the pro-social punishment and co-
operation equilibrium out-compete those at the defection equilibrium (Boyd et al., 2003).
We have shown here that the presence of anti-social punishers reduces the likelihood of
the second condition being met, by reducing the basin of attraction for the pro-social
punishment equilibrium, compared to a population where the anti-social punishers are
replaced with non-punishing defectors. Consequently, a greater between-group variance
in the frequency of pro-social punishment is required in order for some groups to fall in
its basin of attraction, and equilibrium selection to occur.
One way such a greater between-group variance can be achieved is through a reduc-
tion in group size. However, such a requirement eliminates punishment as an explanation
for the maintenance of cooperation in large human groups with low relatedness. Notice
though that the results in this model assume that there is no structure to a society
within a large group. However, internal structure within large groups may in fact be
present e.g. due to social hierarchy or spatial distribution of public goods. Nevertheless,
the homogeneity of within-group structure is a standard assumption in group-structured
models of the evolution of cooperation (Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Boyd et al., 2003,
2010; Wilson, 1975, 1987; Hamilton, 1975; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Lehmann et al.,
2007), and corresponds to a public good that is shared equally with all group mem-
bers. Moreover, if the effective group size of social interactions is smaller then pro-social
punishment may not be necessary to maintain cooperation anyway; direct and indirect
fitness benefits from the cooperative act itself may be sufficient. We have thus focused
here on cases where the public good is shared equally between all group members and
hence pro-social punishment is necessary to maintain cooperation in large groups. For
the same reason, we have also focused on linear public goods games. This is because in
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non-linear public goods games, punishment would not be needed to maintain cooperation
even in large randomly formed groups (Archetti and Scheuring, 2012). Whether real-life
social dilemmas are linear or non-linear is an empirical question that must be answered
on a case by case basis.
It is worth stressing that we have considered the maintenance of punishment,
rather than its invasion from mutation frequency. It is already widely appreciated
that punishment can be stable when common, even if it is not selected when rare
(Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Lehmann et al., 2007). This is because in the standard
model, the total individual cost of punishment decreases as punishers increase in fre-
quency within a group (Equations 3–6). Thus, both pro- and anti-social punishment
undergo positive frequency-dependent selection. In light of this, much work has focused
on the maintenance of punishment (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1992; Henrich and Boyd
2001; Gintis et al. 2003), as we do in this study. Several mechanisms have, however,
been suggested for the invasion of (pro-social) punishment from rarity. These include
kin benefits resulting from punishing acts reducing local competition (Lehmann et al.,
2007), the fixation of punishment within a single group through stochastic processes
(Boyd et al., 2003), voluntary participation in social interactions (Hauert et al., 2007),
systems of reputation (dos Santos et al., 2011), or the coordination of punishing be-
haviour between individuals (Boyd et al., 2010). It has been shown more generally that
social traits which are maladaptive when rare, but advantageous once common, may
be able to reach the threshold frequency for positive selection by drift-like processes
(Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Boyd et al., 2003). One mechanism by which this may oc-
cur is when environmental factors result in population oscillations, and periods where
the environment is temporarily below its maximum carrying capacity (Cˇacˇe and Bryson,
2007; Alizon and Taylor, 2008).
Similarly, future studies should investigate the proximate mechanisms by which anti-
social punishment might be favoured over simple non-punishing defection within a single
group. This is similar to the classic problem of how pro-social punishers may be favoured
over non-punishing cooperators within a single group (Colman, 2006). Essentially, either
type of punishment can be favoured if the effects of punishment are not shared equally
with non-punishers in the same group, but instead feed disproportionately back to the
actor or their kin. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to imagine direct advantage from
anti-social punishment, at least as described here and in the economics literature. How-
ever, a linked consequence such as increased social status may serve as the explanatory
benefit.
In conclusion, we have shown here that the presence of anti-social punishers reduces
the range of conditions over which pro-social punishment and cooperation are stable
in group-structured populations. This occurs because anti-social punishment reduces
the basin of attraction for the pro-social punishment equilibrium within groups. Thus,
a given magnitude of between-group variance may no longer be sufficient to select for
pro-social punishment. In particular, we have shown here how the range of group sizes
over which pro-social punishment is selected can be greatly reduced by anti-social punish-
ment. Given the existence of anti-social punishment in all studied extant human cultures
(Herrmann et al., 2008; Sylwester et al., 2011), our results suggest that the claims of
models showing the evolution of pro-social punishment in group-structured populations
should be re-evaluated with the addition of anti-social punishment.
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